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An election is considered, by most po litica l analysts, as one o f  the cardinal p illars o f  
democracy, although hy itse lf  an election does not turn a political system into a 
democracy. Put sim ply, an election is a critical ingredient o f  democracy, hut does not, 
in and o f  itself, constitute a sufficient po litica l condition fo r  dem ocratic practice and 
culture. In Lesotho, like in most African states, the contribution o f  elections to 
democracy is ham pered by po litica l instability. Some o f  the negative impacts o f  
political instability on elections include the tendency to divert the electora te’s attention 
from real national/policy issues to trivial issues o f  personality squabbles and political 
apathy which in turn reduces voter participation during the election.
Introduction
One of the most intractable social problems o f the developing countries has 
been political instability. Instability is used here to refer to a situation or 
process whereby a society is steeped in overt and covert conflicts which in turn 
pose serious threats to its social fabric. It should be emphasised from the on­
set that conflicts, in and o f  themselves, may have a positive and dynamising 
effect on social change. Put differently, not all types o f conflict are 
undesirable for social change. However, if conflicts are not well-managed and 
ultimately translate into violent confrontation among various political actors, 
then instability sets in.
Instability creates a climate whereby both state and non-state actors end up 
devoting an enormous amount o f  energy and resources either escalating or 
containing conflict situations. Consequently, economic development is 
sacrificed on the silver platter o f  political expediency. As economic 
development fails, poverty becomes acute. Under conditions of poverty, 
various types o f  conflict multiply and become uncontrollable. A combination
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of the political and economic conflicts has clearly marked the phenomenal 
incidence o f instability in developing societies. In this sense, it is easy to 
locate the direct correlation between political instability and poverty in most of 
these societies.
Lesotho, as one of the developing societies, is no exception to the general trend 
of instability which is generated by multivariate conflicts. Our concern in this 
article is mainly with political instability. We trace the root causes of this 
instability and interrogate the extent to which general elections help escalate or 
de-escalate this instability.
Section One below presents an overview of Lesotho’s political landscape with 
a view to provide a context for subsequent discussion on instability and 
elections. Section Two unravels the nature o f political instability using two 
complementary modes of analysis: (a) institutional-functional ism and (b) 
structuralism. Section Three investigates the implications of political instability 
for the forthcoming general elections in Lesotho. The conclusion restates the 
principal thrust o f  the paper.
Lesotho’s Political Landscape
Political instability in Lesotho is undoubtedly embedded within the trajectory 
of the country’s political development, especially since its independence in 
1966. This political transition was preceded by two important electoral 
contests which set the scene for the country’s post-colonial politics (Matlosa, 
1997). The first was the District Council election o f  1960 and the National 
Assembly election ot 1965. The three main contestants in the District Councils 
election were the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the Basutoland National 
Party (BNP) and the Marematlou Party (MTP). The BCP won the electoral 
contest with a comfortable margin and was set for a landslide victory in the 
general election five years down the line. However, the BNP won the 1965 
contest with a razor-thin majority to the chagrin o f the overconfident BCP and 
indeed to the dismay o f  Lesotho’s political observers who had predicted an 
easy BCP victory (tor reasons behind the BNP victory see Weisfelder, 1974; 
Bardill and Cobbe, 1985; Matlosa, 1997). Relations between these two parties 
were marked by mutual mistrust, subdued hostility or outright hatred which in 
turn led to deep polarisation o f  society along political lines over and above
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various other social cleavages. This situation had certainly laid a fertile ground 
for deep-seated political instability during the post-independence era.
After independence, the country inherited the Westminster model of 
government which was to ensure parliamentary democracy after the image of 
its colonial metropole-Britain. On the basis o f  this political model, a multi­
party political system based on general election after every five years was 
envisioned. Thus the first round o f electoral contest in post-colonial Lesotho 
was in 1970. Still conscious o f  its pyrrhic victory during the 1965 election and 
worried about the prospect o f  losing state power to the popular and well- 
organised BCP, the BNP turned the tables up-side down by annulling the 
election; suspending the constitution; suspending the judiciary; putting the late 
King Moshoeshoe 11 under house arrest; arresting opposition leaders and 
banning the Communist Party o f Lesotho (CPL). Not only was the stage set 
for intense, and at times violent, conflicts, but by 1970 the seeds of instability 
had begun to germinate.
The 1970 election contributed to Lesotho’s political instability not only because 
it was a clear breach or violation o f democratic culture and practice, but 
moreso because it laid a firm ground for authoritarian rule. That rule 
proceeded through both repression and accommodation of opposition elements 
aimed mainly at entrenching the BNP political elite in power and keeping the 
BCP at bay. Repression was anchored upon the security establishment while 
accommodation rested on patronage and pork-barrel politics. As the political 
elite began to view politics in zero-sum terms, and not as a positive-sum game, 
contestation for state power became tantamount to some form of warfare 
whereby only the fittest would survive. State managers would invest more 
energy and resources on annihilating the opposition than on ensuring social 
stability and economic development. Some of the outcomes of the twin- 
strategy o f repression and accommodation were increased defense spending and 
misuse/abuse o f  public resources by the ruling elite for self-serving political 
ends.
The Machiavellian praetorianism that marked Lesotho’s politics since 1970 
meant that elections would not feature prominently in the rulers’ political 
scheme of things. Their continued legitimation and credibility would rest more 
on coercion and diktat than on persuasion and consensus. Evidently, the 
Lesotho state has experienced a serious institutional crisis since 1970. This has
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been manifested by clear lack of coordination and checks and balances betw een 
and among the key organs o f government i.e. the Executive, the Judiciary, the 
Legislature including the subsidiary layers such as the bureaucracy and the 
security establishment. T h e  political supremacy o t  the executive over all other 
organs of the state was entrenched and this in part explains the all-pervasive 
politicisation of the key organs of the state in a way that they served the class 
interest of the ruling elite. T h e  institutional crisis o f  the state also ex p ressed  
itself in the form o f  a profound legitimacy and credibility crisis of the 
government (i.e. state managers). T h e  general political disenchantment of 
electorate; internal faction-fighting within the ruling party; and conflicts 
between the executive and the security establishment were all critical 
manifestations o f the legitimacy and credibility crisis of the state managers.
I
Until 1985, the BNP would not venture into any general election for fear of 
retribution from the electorate and the prospect o f  losing state power. Even 
the 1985 ‘mock’ election was called under pressure from internal and external 
forces which were eager to see restoration o f the legitimacy and credibility of 
state mangers and institutional stability o f  the state. The opposition parties 
boycotted the electoral contest due mainly to two provisions of the electoral 
law: (a) that each candidate had to pay M 1000.00 for his/her candidature; and 
(b) that a candidate had to mobilise about 500 signatures of supporters 
endorsing his/her candidature. Although the election never really took place, 
the BNP candidates were declared elected unopposed merely upon nomination. 
Like the 1970 election, the 1985 ‘m ock’ election only helped harden political 
attitudes and tan open hostility and polarisation in a manner that escalates 
conflicts and instability in Lesotho. It is no exaggeration to surmise that after 
th i 1985 election, the BNP government had reached a political cul-de-sac.
It was not surprising, therefore, that the BNP government was toppled by the 
military in 1986. Although various internal and external factors contributed to 
that sudden political change, the first o f  its nature in the whole Southern Africa 
region, the crisis o f  legitimacy and credibility occupied centre-stage. During 
its eight-year tenure o f  office, the military regime merely deepened the 
authoritai ian character o f  the state and its institutional crisis became much 
more pronounced. The legitimacy o f the rulers was founded solely on the 
bullet rather than the ballot. In the process, democratic practice and culture 
remained a distant mirage. Under pressure from both internal and external 
actors, the military relinquished power in 1993, retired gracefully to the
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barracks and opened the political market place to free competition for state 
power. This led to the holding o f the 1993 election which was won 
overwhelmingly by the BCP (Southall and Petlane, 1995; Matlosa, 1997).
Interestingly, the 1993 election turned out to be all about settling political 
scores of 1970. The electoral contest was more about punishing the BNP for 
its unconstitutional actions during and after the 1970 election than about the 
critical issues for the survival and economic development o f  the country. 
Issues of policy and ideological differences mattered little in the minds of the 
electorate as emotions drove their impulses to punish the BNP and reward the 
BCP. Hence it was that, as Ajulu puts it, "the 1993 Lesotho election was 
precisely about the 1970 election" (1995:16). Southall and Petlane corroborate 
this observation by arguing that "the 1993 was viewed overwhelmingly as an 
opportunity to right the historical wrong done to the country by the BNP by 
its unconstitutional seizure o f power in 1970" (1995:xiii). The BCP’s landslide 
victory was both intriguing and interesting. Intriguing because although most 
political observers had predicted a likely victory for the BCP, the scale o f  the 
victory stunned even experts themselves. Interesting because the electoral 
outcome ensured continuity o f  Lesotho’s age-old tradition of one-party rule, 
albeit this time around predicated, as it were, on the ballot not on the bullet. 
Even the 1993 election, which is generally acclaimed as the most democratic 
of all the post-independence electoral contests, did not lead to de-escalation of 
Lesotho’s conflicts and instability.
The key manifestations o f  the instability included: (a) conflicts between the 
state managers and other key organs o f  the state such as the monarchy, the 
security establishment, the bureaucracy etc.; (b) diminishing national 
sovereignty as external forces came to play a key role in resolving Lesotho 
internal conflict thus stealing the political limelight from the state and its 
institutions; and (c) intense faction-fighting within the BCP which ultimately 
led to the split within the party.
The Nature o f Political Instability
A careful and rigorous analysis o f  political instability in any society requires 
an application o f  useful and reliable instruments of interpretation of 
phenomena. Without such tools, any adventure into that exercise will be 
tantamount to navigating in the high seas without a compass. In order to dig
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out the deeper roots and permutations of political instability in Lesotho, this 
study uses two distinct, albeit complementary, approaches: (a) institutional- 
functional ism and (b) structuralism. The former explains instability by 
focusing on the interface between institutionalisation and political participation, 
while the latter gives pride o f place to social stratification and the configuration 
of power relations among social forces within and without the ambit of the 
state.
(a) Institutional-functionalism: institutions and participation
In his seminal work published in 1968 under the title "Political Order in 
Changing Societies", Samuel Huntington propounded a thesis that in societies 
where political participation is high yet the process o f  political 
institutionalisation is low and weak, there is bound to be what he terms 
political instability or political decay. Political instability/decay in most 
developing societies, argues Huntington, is "in large part the product of rapid 
social change and rapid mobilisation of new groups into politics coupled with 
the slow development o f  political institutions" (1968:4).
In most African countries, Lesotho included, the political system is fragmented 
and the "political institutions have little power, less majesty, and no resiliency 
...[and]...  governments simply do not govern"(Huntington, 1968:2). 
Huntington perceives political institutionalisation as the process by which 
organisations and procedures acquire value and stability over time. The degree 
o f institutionalisation o f any political system can best be defined by 
adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organisations and 
procedures (Huntington, 1968:12).
The application of the Huntingtonian thesis in Lesotho’s contemporary politics 
reveals that, indeed, there is a high rate of political mobilisation and 
participation whereas political institutionalisation severely lags behind. The 
incongruence between political participation and institutionalisation helps us to 
fathom the present political instability/decay which has thus far adversely 
affected the nation-building project and economic development as a whole. 
The four defining characteristics of political institutionalisation can be used as 
the key indicators to demonstrate the incompatibility o f  participation and 
institutionalisation which in turn breeds political instability/decay.
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(i) Adaptability-Rigidity
The political system is not static; it is a dynamic process that has to always 
adapt to both endogenous and exogenous changes in order to function properly. 
The more the adaptability o f  the system, observes Huntington, "the more 
highly institutionalised it is; the less adaptable and more rigid it is, the lower 
its level o f  institutionalisation" (1968:13). The Lesotho political system 
exhibits extreme forms o f  rigidity which inhibit adaptability to domestic, 
regional and global changes over time. This explains, in part, why the country 
is unable to adapt properly to the current centripetal pressures unleashed by the 
twin processes o f  globalisation and regionalisation to the extent that its very 
survival is at risk. The specific examples that attest to the rigidity o f the 
system are as follows:
♦ the one-party rule remains the norm since the 1966 
independence;
♦ the electoral system has not been adapted in such a way that it 
provides mutual benefit to the electorate and political leaders; 
and
♦ from 1970 to 1993, the country was ruled by decrees as the 
national constitution remained suspended.
(ii) Com plexity-Sim plicity
The political system is complex if it is run by clearly structured hierarchies of 
power, authority and responsibilities. It is simple if it rotates around an 
individual, thereby promoting the personality cult syndrome. The more the 
complex the system, the more institutionalised it is; the less complex and more 
simple it is, the less institutionalised it is. The simplicity of the Lesotho 
political system is marked by the following:
♦ the personality cult syndrome;
♦ lack o f distinction between the ruling party and government;
♦ problems o f  succession at both party and government levels; 
and
♦ the predominance o f  patronage or pork-barrel politics.
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(iii) Autonomy-Subordination
Another measure o f  the level o f  institutionalisation o f  the system is the extent 
to which it is relatively autonomous from various political forces operating 
within it. Huntington postulates that "political institutionalisation, in the sense 
of autonomy, means the development o f  political organisations and procedures 
that are not simply expressions o f  the interests o f  particular social groups" 
(1968:20). In other words the state must develop national programmes that 
transcend sectarian interests o f  particular social or class forces and in that way 
political institutionalisation is ensured. That the key organs o f the Lesotho 
state are subordinated to the interests o f the ruling class for both political 
expediency and economic accumulation brooks no dispute.
(iv) Coherence-Disunity
The coherence o f the political system is crucial in determining its level of 
institutionalisation. According to Huntington, the more unified and coherent 
the system is, "the more highly institutionalised it is; the greater the disunity 
of the . ..[system ...,  the less it is institutionalised" (1968:22). The coherence 
of the system can be ensured through a broadly-based political consensus ora 
social contract between the government and the governed, political tolerance 
and respect for all symbols o f nationhood. Disunity which undermines stability 
and institutionalisation in Lesotho is manifested by the following:
♦ deep-seated political polarisation;
♦ intense political conflicts and lack o f internal conflict 
management mechanisms; and
♦ intervention o f  various external forces into the system, thus 
undermining the capacity o f  the state and whittling the already 
debile sovereignty.
As is abundantly clear from the foregoing, Huntington’s institutional- 
functionalist approach is much more concerned with political institutions and 
political behaviour and how their interface leads to either stability or 
instability. Valuable as this approach is, its major deficiency is that it reduces 
the heart ot politics to institutions and the way they function. In this way, this 
approach fails to capture the role o f  other social forces outside the state sphere 
in moulding political systems. This is so because the approach does not seem
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to acknowledge the existence o f  class and class struggles in African societies. 
That is why it does not perceive some of the conflicts as class-based, but rather 
suggests that all forms of instability are related to the degree of 
institutionalisation and level o f  participation. The structuralist perspective 
comes in handy as a complementary theoretical theodolite for measuring 
political instability in Africa. It is to this perspective that we now turn.
(b) Structuralism: the power-development nexus
Structuralist approaches to the analysis o f  political instability in Africa proceed 
from the premise that the ruling classes have reduced political power to an end 
in itself primarily for their own self-serving interests. Hence it was that 
African politics came to centre more around the state and state power leading 
Chabal to conclude that "to talk about politics in Africa is virtually to talk 
about the state" (1994:68). This is exactly how the ruling elite defines the 
political process. In this perception, national development suffers as the ruling 
eiite focus energies and resources to that ‘scarce commodity’.power. The 
capture of state power, upon independence, immediately assured the new ruling 
elite enormous political power. The newly-acquired political power was then 
translated into economic power through accumulation and, in most instances, 
malfeasance by the ruling classes. The combination of political and economic 
power was meant to ensure the total, and, most often uncontested, hegemony 
of the ruling party over politics both within and outside the ^tate sphere. This 
explains, in part, the all-pervasive tendency towards authoritarianism of both 
civilian and military varieties in the African continent especially during the 
period 1960s-1980s. There is no doubt that one o f the victims of political 
instability and economic malaise in Africa has been development since 
independence. Claude Ake reminds us that:
although political independence brought some changes to the composition of 
the state m anagers, the charactcr o f the state remained much as it has in the 
colonial era. It continued to he totalistic in scope, constituting a statist 
economy. It presented itself as an apparatus o f violence, had a narrow social 
base, and relied for com pliance on coercion rather than authority (1996:3).
This does clearly suggest that the political environment in Africa since 
independence, with few exceptions, has been immensely inimical to 
development. In A ke’s words, "the struggle for power was so absorbing that 
everything else, including development, was marginalised" (1996:7). Chabal
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corroborates this argument by observing that the post-colonial state was 
endowed with
an inordinate degree o f power, given the means to control the fate and the 
resources o f the independent country effectively unhindered and unaccountable.
It was not just that the post-colonial state possessed all the formal power and 
attributes of the colonial state, it was also that it was subject to the constraints 
o f colonial political accountability (1994:72).
Herein lies the power-development nexus that explains political instability 
through the epistemological prisms o f  structuralism. Simply put, the social 
stratification in Africa since independence has ensured the political hegemony 
of the ruling classes over all other class forces. Capturing state power became 
a sine qua non for hegemonic politics. Hegemonic politics has given way to 
perpetual underdevelopment and the institutionalisation o f  what could he 
termed ‘crony democracy’in most African countries. This political hegemony 
has been used by the ruling classes not only to reproduce themselves, but also 
to ensure economic accumulation. The failure of development strategies and 
policies led to the diminution o f the legitimacy and credibility of the ruling 
parties in the eyes o f  the electorate. The more the ruling parties lost their 
legitimacy and credibility, the more they resorted to rule by coercion and this 
in turn intensified political instability.
Lesotho’s political elite has not behaved any differently from their counterparts 
in other parts o f the African continent thus far. From the BNP government, 
through the military junta and the BCP rule, to the present LCD regime, the 
principal pre-occupation of the ruling elite has been the accumulation of power 
and imposing their political hegemony over other class forces outside the state 
in order to undermine opposition. Carrot and stick tactics have been 
effectively used by the ruling elite with a view to exhort political acquiescence 
on the part of various other actors in the political scene. The carrot strategy 
has involve mainly a recourse to politics o f  patronage or what can otherwise 
be termed pork-barrel politics whereby the political elite extends political 
favours to buy support. The stick strategy has taken the form of repression by 
way of elevating the role of the bullet as a medium of interaction and discourse 
in the political system, thus undermining the significance of the ballot. This 
has essentially been the form and content of Lesotho’s ‘crony democracy’ 
whose principal anchors have been repression and accommodation. This
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explains why elections have not really been a key pillar of Lesotho’s political 
system since independence. The ruling political elite did not see the value of 
elections as they generally perceived the fountain of their legitimacy as the 
security establishment which was immensely abused. Even the few elections 
that were attempted were either marked by conflict or resulted in conflict 
situations. What then are the implications o f the current conflict situation in 
Lesotho for the 1998 election? It to this vexed question that the next section 
now turns the spotlight.
Implications for the 1998 Election
The Lesotho election has been scheduled for the 23th May and parliament was 
dissolved on the 27th February 1998. A lot of steps have been taken to 
prepare for the election including (a) the establishment of the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC); (b) the amendment of the Constitution to allow 
the eighteen-year youth to vote; (c) the delimitation of constituencies; (d) the 
Ngo-driven process o f  voter education; (e) registration of political parties in 
advance o f political campaign; and (f) registration of voters.
The above steps notwithstanding, the IEC seems to be facing difficult problems 
which could hamper the smooth running of the election. In fact the IEC and 
the government disagreed fundamentally on the appropriate date for the 
election. The former proposed that the election be rescheduled for sometime 
in August 1998. Various factors drove the IEC perception that it would be 
impossible to organise a free and fair election any time between April and June 
1998. These included the following: (a) voter register has not yet been 
compiled and computerised; (b) the IEC itself does not seem to have enough 
resources (financial, technical and human) to organise the election as originally 
envisaged; (c) the sour relations between the IEC and the government does not 
augur well for smooth preparation o f the election; and (d) the delimitation of 
constituencies is still marred by some controversy between the government and 
the opposition parties given that it was undertaken prior to the establishment 
of the IEC, hence opposition political parties argue that it amounted to 
gerrymandering by the ruling party.
Although the election process itself is confronted with various technical 
oroblems which fall outside the purview of this article, the major challenge is 
posed by political instability in the country which has a long history and deep-
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seated roots. The climax o f this instability was wrought by the split of the 
ruling party 1997 which led to the establishment of the Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD) which immediately declared itself the ruling party. In the 
meantime, the BCP which was put into power by a popular vote in 1993 was 
turned into an official opposition. This situation has not only exposed 
hollowness o f the Constitution in guarding against political excesses by the 
executive branch o f government, but has caused so much bitterness among both 
the political elites and the mass of the people. It has deepened further political 
polarisation and political disenchantment which are clearly to have their own 
impact on the election. Anecdotal evidence point to a tendency towards 
political apathy among Basotho and their loss o f confidence in political parties. 
This suggests two possible processes: (a) this election will be marked by more 
independent candidates than any other election in Lesotho’s history; and (b) 
voter turn-over will be extremely low compared with the past elections. It is 
therefore not surprising that some labour unions have publicly passed a vote 
of no confidence in political parties and announced that they will field their 
own candidates during the election who will represent workers’ interests in 
parliament.
On Sunday, 1st February 1998, the Lesotho Clothing and Allied Workers 
Union (LECAW U) held a special conference to elect its own candidate for the 
forthcoming general election who will contest for a parliamentary seat in the 
Thetsane Constituency No. 31. The importance of this conference, which was 
attended by about 600 workers, is three-pronged. First, thus far unions have 
been tied to right-wing parties which have misused and abused them for the 
latter’s own self-serving political ends. Unions in Lesotho are beginning to 
come to terms with this stark reality and this conference was an important step 
to break with the past political traditions and as such it represents a political 
tendency that could threaten the power base of right-wing political elite. 
Second, the conference set a precedent which could as well be replicated in 
other industries and other spheres o f social life as organised civil society 
becomes disenchanted with the political elite. This is a trend that is discernible 
in most parts o f Africa since the late 1980s which some scholars refer to as the 
informalisation o f  politics (Gibbon et al, 1992). Thirdly, the conference 
elected a female candidate, Mrs Matanki MokhantSo, thus contributing to 
efforts made by various organs o f civil society to increase women’s 
participation in the country’s political process.
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A couple o f  weeks after L E C A W U ’s ostensibly epoch-making conference, a 
serious industrial dispute erupted at Thetsane industrial site as the CGM factory 
workers demanded improved remuneration and working conditions. As the 
management remained intransigent and ultimately purported to have summarily 
dismissed all the workers, the latter staged a sit-in on the factory premises and 
locked part o f  the management inside the factory for the entire night of 
February 12, 1998. A court order directing the workers to leave the premises 
of the factory and to release the management was served on the Union leader, 
Billy Macaefa, at around 10.00 p.m. Since the workers had ignored the court 
order, in the morning of the following day, the police intervened forcefully and 
killed one woman while six more workers sustained serious bullet injuries. 
Furthermore, about 40 more people suffered injuries but were discharged 
immediately from Queen Elizabeth 11 Hospital in Maseru on Friday, 13th 
February 1998.
This incident was high on the agenda of nine (9) trade unions which met from 
14th to 15th February, 1998 at the Maseru Campus of the National University 
of Lesotho to form a trade union federation known as the Congress of Lesotho 
Trade Unions (COLETU). The conference condemned the killing of one 
worker, injury o f many others and harassment of the leader o f  LECAWU by 
the police. Furthermore, the conference resolved as follows, among others: 
(a) COLETU fully supports the decision by LECAWU to field an independent 
candidate for the forthcoming election; (b) COLETU shall not look at trade 
unionism from a narrow economistic standpoint, but shall have a clear political 
programme to address the broader interests of the working class; and (c) 
COLETU shall strike a tactical alliance with a progressive political party whose 
manifesto and track record would be found to be in accord with the W orkers’ 
Charter and interests o f  the workers.
Conclusion
Political instability has critical bearing on elections and democracy in any given 
country. In Lesotho, it is abundantly clear that elections have either fanned 
political conflicts or have not been able to resolve deep-seated conflicts. This 
does not mean that elections are inherently conflict-inducing or are unable, in 
and of themselves, to reduce the intensity of instability. But this situation 
illustrates the manner in which Lesotho’s political elite perceive politics and the 
role of elections. As we have argued, the political elite view politics in zero-
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sum terms and regard elections as an exercise wherein winner takes all and 
totally annihilates the loser and in turn institutionalises what can he termed 
‘crony democracy’. The term ‘crony democracy’ is used here to characterise 
the type o f political system which is predicated mainly on patronage and pork- 
barrel politics. Interestingly, the tlip-side o f pork-barrel politics is political 
repression and authoritarianism. So ‘crony democracy’ could be seen as 
democracy for the political elite and their cronies and authoritarianism for 
many other social forces outside the state arena who cannot be won over 
through patronage. This has been the hallmark of Lesotho politics since 
independence to date and to what extent the 1998 election will bring about a 
fundamental change o f the system away from ‘crony democracy’ still remains 
a moot point.
Lesotho Social Science Review Vol. 3 No. 2 107
References
Ake, C. Development and Democracy in Africa (Washington D.C:The 
Brookings Institution, 1996).
Ajulu, R. "From Collaboration to Dilemma: A Historical Background to 
Lesotho’s Election o f 1993" in Southall and Petlane (eds) ibid.
Bardill, J. and Cobbe, J. (eds) Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern 
Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).
Chabal, P. Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation (London: 
MacMillan, 1994).
Gibbon, P., Bangura, Y. and Ofstad, A. (eds) Authoritarianism. Democracy 
and Adjustment: The Politics of Economic Reform in Africa (Uppsala: The 
Scandinavian Institute o f  African Studies, 1992).
Huntington, S. Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale: Yale University 
Press, 1968).
Matlosa, K. "The 1993 Elections in Lesotho and the Nature of the BCP 
Victory" African Journal o f Political Science, 2(1), 1997.
Southall, R. and Petlane, T. (eds) Democratisation and Demilitarisation in 
Lesotho: the general election o f 1993 and its aftermath (Pretoria: Africa 
Institute o f  South Africa, 1995).
Weisfelder, R. Defining National Purpose: The Roots of Factionalism in 
Lesotho, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1974.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons
Attribution -  Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/bv-nc-nd/3.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
i
® *V |nstitu te of
Development Studies
